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Abstract 
 
The low ecological validity of much of the research on deception detection is a limitation 
recognised by researchers in the field. Consequently, the present studies investigated subjective 
cues to deception using the real life, high stakes situation of people making public appeals for 
help with missing or murdered relatives. It was expected that cues related to affect would be 
particularly salient in this context. Study 1 was a qualitative investigation identifying cues to 
deception reportedly used by people accurate at detecting deception.  Studies 2 and 3 were then 
empirical investigations which mainly employed the cues reported in Study 1. A number of 
subjective cues were found to discriminate between honest and deceptive appeals, including 
some previously unidentified cues, and cues likely to be context-specific. Most could be 
categorised under the themes of authenticity of emotion, and negative and positive affective 
reactions to the appealer. It is concluded that some cues to deception may emerge only in real 
life, high stakes situations; however, it is argued that some of these may be influenced by 
observers’ perceptions of the characteristics of offenders, rather than acts of deception per se. 
 
. 
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Subjective Cues to Deception in a High Stakes Situation: Public Appeals for Help with 
Missing or Murdered Relatives 
The low ecological validity of the majority of deception research is a limitation that has been 
recognised by a number of researchers in the field (see, for example, Frank & Svetieva, 2012; 
Granhag & Stromwall, 2004; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). So far, most deception research has 
been confined to low stakes, laboratory studies, the findings of which may be applicable to the 
low stakes situations in which they were carried out, but may have less relevance to more high 
stakes situations, such as most forensic contexts. In particular, the use of low stakes situations 
may lead to underestimates of the effectiveness of some cues in detecting deception in more 
realistic forensic situations. For example, in their meta-analysis of cues to deception, DePaulo 
et al. (2003) found that strong motivation to succeed in the lie, and lies about transgressions, 
factors more likely to be present in high stakes situations, emerged as important moderating 
factors in the elicitation of prominent cues to deception. Indeed, the small body of existing 
research investigating real life, high stakes lies, has produced some promising results, and 
suggests that there may be some useful cues to deception that are more likely to emerge in high 
stakes situations; for example, an increase in speech dysfluency (Davis, Markus, Walters, 
Vorus & Connors, 2005; Vrij & Mann, 2001a), and equivocal language (Adams & Jarvis, 2006; 
Wright Whelan, Wagstaff & Wheatcroft 2013). 
 However, DePaulo and Morris (2004) have suggested that there may be further, 
previously unidentified, cues to deception that may emerge only in high stakes situations, and 
may be specific to particular forensic contexts (see also, Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). For 
example, in their study of 911 homicide calls, Harpster, Adams and Jarvis (2009) found 19 
behaviours that discriminated significantly between innocent callers and callers who were later 
found to be involved in the homicides they were reporting. Importantly, a number of these 
behaviours had not been previously identified and were likely to be specific to the particular 
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context; for example, acceptance of death, plea for the caller only, and insulting the victim. 
Furthermore, it can be noted that a number of cues identified in this study are not readily 
accommodated by the four major factors that are popularly considered by researchers to 
underlie the production of cues to deception, as summarised in Zuckerman, DePaulo and 
Rosenthal’s (1981) Four Factor Model: Lying involves complex and simultaneous cognitive 
tasks, and consequently liars are expected to produce behaviours associated with increased 
cognitive load. Liars are also expected to experience affective responses associated with the 
act of deception, typically, shame, guilt, fear and anxiety. Liars may take their credibility for 
granted less than truth-tellers, and so may control their behaviour in an attempt to suppress 
signs of deception, and also to simulate credible behaviours. And the act of deception may 
produce psychological discomfort, resulting in increased arousal in the autonomic nervous 
system, and associated involuntary physiological reactions. The inability of these existing 
theoretical approaches to adequately account for the newly identified cues in Harpster et al.’s 
study (2009), suggests that new theoretical approaches may be required to account for cues that 
may emerge only in specific, high stakes contexts. 
 To maximise the possibility of finding such previously unidentified cues, it is also 
important to consider the methodology employed. For instance, despite meta-analytic findings 
that suggest that subjective impressions and implicit measures may be more powerful than 
objective measures in discriminating between honesty and deception (DePaulo et al., 2003), 
the focus in most of the research so far on high stakes lies has mainly been on objective cues 
that allow investigation with frequency counts; i.e. few have examined more subjective cues to 
deception (see, for example, Koper & Sahlman, 1991; Mann & Vrij, 2006). Given these 
considerations, the overall aim of the present research was to investigate the possible presence 
of cues to deception and to honesty using subjective observer ratings of behaviours, in a specific 
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high stakes situation; that is, public appeals for help with regard to missing or murdered 
relatives.  
Three studies are described, all of which employed real-life video clips of people 
appearing in front of the press, appealing for help with regard to a missing or murdered relative. 
Some of these were deceptive (i.e. the appealer was later found to be involved in the death or 
disappearance of their relative), and some were truthful (the appealer was not involved in the 
death or disappearance of their relative). The first study was a qualitative investigation of the 
subjective cues to deception and to honesty reportedly used by a small group of people found 
to be unusually accurate at detecting deception in appeals. The purpose of this study was to 
identify possible cues that may not have previously been identified and may be specific to the 
context of making appeals. Thus an exploratory, inductive approach was used, rather than 
theoretical prediction. The aim of the second study was to investigate which of the cues 
identified in the first study successfully discriminated between honest and deceptive appealers 
using the same set of stimulus materials, but using a different, independent panel of raters. 
Those cues found to be useful in discriminating between honest and deceptive appeals in Study 
2 were then included in a third validation study, which used an entirely new and larger stimulus 
set. As the initial study was essentially inductive and exploratory, no explicit hypotheses were 
proposed at the outset; however, because appeals for missing or murdered relatives are likely 
to be an emotionally charged event, it was assumed that affective responses (i.e. responses 
related to grief, anxiety etc.) might be particularly salient. 
Study 1 
To reiterate, the aim of this first study was to generate subjective cues to deception and to 
honesty, reportedly used by a small group of people found to be unusually accurate at detecting 
deception in appeals.  
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Method 
Participants. Two participants were recruited for the study; both had taken part in a 
previous study on cues to deception, and had achieved accuracy rates above 87% in 
distinguishing between deceptive and honest appealers (see Wright Whelan, 2009).   
Materials and procedure. The study used  nine video clips of people making appeals 
for help with missing or murdered relatives; five involved honest appealers (another person has 
been convicted of the murder or kidnap of the relative), and four, deceptive appealers (the 
appealer has been convicted of murdering their relative). The two participants were asked, 
individually, to view each appeal with regard to whether it was deceptive or honest, and to 
report and comment on any behaviours they used to decide if the appealer was deceptive or 
truthful. After viewing each clip a semi-structured interview schedule was used to prompt the 
participants to comment further on aspects which they may not previously have mentioned.  
Data Analysis and Discussion 
The responses of the two participants were analysed using the inductive thematic analysis 
procedure described by Hayes (2000) and Braun and Clarke (2006).  The data were analysed 
as two separate elements, deceptive appealers and honest appealers. First, the responses were 
read carefully and repeatedly to identify units of text relevant to the research topic, and to 
search for meanings and patterns. Second, units relating to the same topic were grouped 
together into categories and initial codes were generated. Units of text could be included in 
more than one category, and the entire content of the data set was coded. The data were 
reviewed to ensure that each category was sufficiently supported by the units. The analysis 
identified five key themes for the deceptive appealers; fake emotion, lack of emotion, 
distancing, implausibility, and negative personal reaction. Four key themes were identified for 
the honest appealers; genuine sadness, genuine/heartfelt, containing emotion, and sympathetic 
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personal reaction. Each key theme had a number of associated categories, resulting in a total 
of 50 cues. The themes and categories, with the number of units in each category, are presented 
in Table 1. 
It is relevant to note here that the conceptual distinction between cues to honesty and 
cues to deception is an important one. The premise underlying this distinction is that while the 
presence of a particular cue may probabilistically indicate honesty, its absence does not 
necessarily indicate dishonesty; similarly while the presence of a particular cue may 
probabilistically indicate deceit, its absence does not necessarily indicate honesty. Indeed, to 
infer one from the other would be to commit a logical fallacy of the form, ‘if A then B, 
therefore, if not A then not B’.  
It can be noted that although some of these cues have been investigated elsewhere, the 
majority have not previously been identified. This suggests that the type of inductive approach 
used in this study may be useful for identifying potential cues that have not been suggested by 
existing theoretical approaches. Amongst these, cues related to the affect of the appealers, and 
the affective responses of the observers to the appealers, are perhaps of particular interest, and 
their possible theoretical significance is considered later. However, the first task was to 
establish whether cues of this kind could be used to reliably discriminate between truthful and 
deceptive appeals.   
Study 2 
As noted previously, Study 2 was an empirical investigation to validate the cues to deception 
and to honesty identified in Study 1, using the same materials but with a different, independent 
panel of raters. Since the sample size was small, and consequently there was a risk of Type II 
errors in analyses of statistical significance, it was decided to also examine effect sizes in order 
to illuminate meaningful differences between deceptive and honest appeals (Howell, 2002). 
Method 
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Participants. Five new observers were recruited on a voluntary basis to rate the 
materials. Ages of the raters ranged from 21 to 75. One rater was a postgraduate psychology 
student and four were non-psychologists. None had previously received any formal training in 
lie detection techniques.  
Materials and procedure. The video clips were the same as those used in Study 1. 
Observers were shown an appeal, and were then required to complete a response sheet, which 
contained one statement relating to each cue identified in Study 1 (for example, ‘This person’s 
emotions are fake’). Observers were asked to indicate their agreement with each statement on 
a five point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). This process was 
repeated for each clip. The clips were presented in a different, randomised order for each 
observer, and each observer completed the rating procedure individually.  
Results and Discussion 
To assess inter-rater reliability between the five observers, Kendall’s W was calculated for each 
cue. Inter-rater reliability was not significant (p>.05) for seven of the cues, which were dropped 
from further analysis (calm and calculated, lack of emotion in voice, irrelevant/generic 
statements, positive emotion expressed towards relative, smile appropriate to speech content, 
avoid brutal language/detail, and behaving as expected). Average Spearman r for dropped cues 
ranged from r = .011 (smile appropriate to speech content) to r = .230 (irrelevant/generic 
statements). Average Spearman r for cues that were retained ranged from r = .256 (creepy) to 
r = .663 (pretending to cry). The mean score for each cue in each clip was calculated from the 
scores of the five observers, so that each clip had a single score for each cue; these scores were 
used in all further analyses. 
To investigate which cues were associated with deception, a series of one way 
ANOVAs was conducted on the means for each cue between the deceptive appealers and the 
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honest appealers (veracity condition). Notwithstanding the small sample sizes (5 and 4), at this 
stage the main purpose of the study was still exploratory (to identify cues worthy of further 
investigation) hence the parametric ANOVA was chosen as it is a relatively powerful test, yet 
fairly robust to violations of the standard assumptions with fixed levels of the independent 
variable and fairly equal sample sizes (Glass & Stanley, 1970). A series of ANOVAs was also 
chosen rather than a MANOVA, as there were more dependent variables than cases per cell, 
thus violating the minimal sample size requirement for MANOVA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001).  
As shown in Table 2, cues which yielded significant effects between liars and truth-
tellers were as follows: fake emotion, fake facial expression, putting on a performance, creepy, 
no sympathy for the appealer, high vocal pitch, gaze aversion, and listing things/people, were 
related to deceptive appeals. Sad eyes, containing emotion, and genuine facial expression were 
related to honest appeals. Two cues only very narrowly missed significance on a two-tailed test 
(p<.06), and had means in the expected directions; these were, credible eye contact and 
genuinely sad. Again, in view of the exploratory nature of the study, no correction for multiple 
testing was applied.   
As previously mentioned, it was considered useful to examine effect sizes as well; 
according to Cohen (1988), effect sizes of 0.8 can be considered as large, and a number of cues 
showed effect sizes of this magnitude (d ≥ 0.80) in the predicted directions. These were, 
behaving unnaturally, dislike of the appealer, pretending to cry, no emotional variation, 
emotionally cold, equivocal language, focusing on others, defensive, and does not make sense, 
all of which were associated with deceptive appeals. Genuine/heartfelt appeal, feeling sorry for 
the appealer, normal, feeling the appealer’s pain, and genuine behaviours, were associated with 
honest appeals. 
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Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was significant for the cues fake facial 
expression, no sympathy for appealer, equivocal language, focus on others, genuine facial 
expression and feel sorry for the appealer. Welch’s Test was run on these cues as a check, and 
the results were comparable to the parametric tests (fake facial expression p = .034, no 
sympathy for appealer p = .041, equivocal language p = .093, focus on others p = .192, genuine 
facial expression p = .047, and feel sorry for the appealer p = .113). 
 In sum, 13 cues were found to discriminate significantly, or very near significantly, 
between honest and deceptive appealers, with a further 14 cues having large effect sizes in the 
expected direction. These findings suggest that a large number of behaviours identified by the 
accurate participants in Study 1 may potentially have some utility in discriminating between 
deceptive and honest appealers in. Nevertheless, given the small sample sizes used, and the 
very marginal nature of many of the statistical effects found, there is obviously merit in testing 
further the reliability of these trends on a new and larger sample set. This was the purpose of 
Study 3.  
Study 3 
Given the issues concerning the robustness of the findings in Study 2, the aim of Study 3 was 
to replicate and extend the trends identified in Study 2 on a new and larger sample set. To this 
end, three further subjective cues identified in previous research were included; urgency 
(Harpster et al., 2009), general plausibility (Koper & Sahlman, 1991; DePaulo et al., 2003), 
and a personal and expressive voice (DePaulo et al., 2003). Also included was one cue noted 
by the researcher (voice quivering with genuine emotion). A small number of verbal cues were 
dropped as other research has indicated that they may be more effectively investigated using 
frequency counts; these were, lists, equivocal language, focusing on others, and statement that 
does not make sense (Wright Whelan et al., 2013). Another cue, genuine facial expression, was 
also dropped as it was considered to be the negative equivalent, and, therefore, repetition, of 
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fake facial expression. It can be noted that actuarial rather than theoretical prediction provided 
the primary rationale for the inclusion of cues at this stage; possible theoretical explanations 
for their efficacy are explored later. Due to the lack of previous research in this area, and also 
for reasons discussed previously, it was decided to include non-significant cues with large 
effect sizes in the expected direction, to minimise the risk of Type II errors occurring. 
Method 
Participants. Five observers were used to rate the appeals, all were undergraduate 
psychology students participating for course credit. Again, none had previously received any 
formal training in lie detection techniques. 
  Materials and procedure. The procedure was the same as for Study 2, except 
observers were shown 32 video clips of appeals; 16 honest and 16 deceptive appeals collected 
from various news and media sites from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and 
New Zealand.  This was a larger sample set than is common in high stakes deception studies; 
some studies have used samples of honest and deceptive behaviour from only one individual 
(Villar et al., 2011; Vrij & Mann, 2001a), and a body of research has been based on the 
behaviours of 16 suspects during police interviews (Mann et al., 2002; Mann & Vrij, 2006; 
Mann et al., 2006). 
In all cases classified as deceptive, the appealer was convicted in a criminal court of 
involvement in the death (or in one case, kidnapping), of their relative. In all cases classified 
as honest, either another person was convicted of the death of the relative, or the relative was 
found with no evidence of foul play. In all cases, there was extensive evidence to support the 
conclusion that the appeals were actually truthful or deceptive. All the appeals were made 
within a short time frame after the relative went missing or was murdered. For a full description 
of the sample used in the present study, and the criteria used to determine whether ground truth 
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had been established, see Wright Whelan et al. (2013). As before, the response sheet given to 
each observer contained one statement for each cue.   
Results and Discussion 
Again, to assess inter-rater reliability between the five observers, Kendall’s W was calculated 
for each cue. Inter-rater reliability was not significant for six of the cues (p>.05), which were 
dropped from further analysis (gaze aversion, pretending to cry, no emotional variation, 
defensive, containing emotion, and credible eye contact). One cue, (no sympathy for the 
appealer) narrowly missed significance (p = .054), and was retained for further analysis. 
Average Spearman r for dropped cues ranged from r = .078 (containing emotion) to r = .320 
(no emotional variation). Average Spearman r for cues that were retained ranged from r = .350 
(no sympathy for the appealer) to r = .584 (high vocal pitch). 
The mean of the five observers’ scores for each cue in each clip was calculated, so that 
each clip had a single score for each cue. A MANOVA with Veracity (Truthful / Deceptive) as 
the between-subjects independent variable, was conducted on the mean cue scores for the cues 
expected to be related to deception. The results are shown in Table 3. Using Pillai’s Trace, the 
multivariate test yielded a significant result, F (1, 21) = 2.49, p = .038. Follow-up univariate 
analyses showed significant effects for the following cues, all with means in the expected 
direction: fake emotion, fake facial expression, putting on a performance, behaving 
unnaturally, creepy, dislike for the appealer, and lack of sympathy for the appealer. 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was significant for the cue fake emotion, and 
therefore Welch’s Test was run on this cue as a check; it produced a result comparable to the 
univariate test (p = .001). 
SUBJECTIVE CUES TO DECEPTION IN PUBLIC APPEALS 
 
13 
 
A similar MANOVA with Veracity as a between-subjects independent variable, was 
also conducted on the scores for the cues expected to be related to honesty. The results are 
shown in Table 3. Using Pillai’s Trace, the multivariate test showed a result that approached 
significance, F (1, 19) = 2.10, p = .072; given the result approached significance, and a 
preponderance of large effect sizes, follow-up univariate analyses were conducted, 
nonetheless. These showed significant effects for the following cues, all with means in the 
expected direction: sad eyes, genuinely sad, genuine and heartfelt appeal, urgency, plausible, 
normal, speaking in a personal and expressive way, voice quivering with genuine emotion, 
feeling the appealer’s pain, and feeling sorry for the appealer. 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was significant for the cues sad eyes, 
plausible, and feel sorry for the appealer. Again, Welch’s Test produced results comparable to 
the univariate tests; sad eyes p = .015, feel sorry for the appealer p = .002, plausible p = .005. 
Although it does not affect the interpretation of the results and conclusions, it can be noted that 
in Table 3 the standard deviations for responses to lying appeals are slightly but consistently 
higher than truthful appeals; however, it appears that this was not a feature of responses to lying 
and truthfulness per se, as the opposite was the case in the Study 2 (see Table 2).  Further 
examination of the raw data showed no obvious reasons for these patterns and thus there is no 
obvious explanation for this anomaly.  
General Discussion 
In total, 17 cues discriminated between deceptive and honest appealers in the final analyses, 
and all had large effect sizes in this respect. This endorses the view that using ecologically 
valid stimulus materials, from a specific context, may elicit specific cues not apparent in typical 
low stakes, laboratory situations. Indeed, several of the cues identified as discriminating 
between honesty and deception in appeals are original, notwithstanding that some may be 
SUBJECTIVE CUES TO DECEPTION IN PUBLIC APPEALS 
 
14 
 
predicted by previous research. Affective responses emerged as a key element in most of the 
cues which discriminated between deceptive and honest appeals, and the two overarching 
categories of cues could be described as those relating to ‘emotional authenticity’, and 
‘personal reaction to the appealer’.  
Cues relating to emotional authenticity (or a lack thereof), are in line with the 
behavioural control factor of the Four Factor Model (Zuckerman et al., 1981), and the findings 
suggest not only that emotional authenticity may be useful in discriminating between honesty 
and deception in this context, but also that untrained observers may be able to detect simulated 
emotion. The findings concerning fake facial expressions, and sad eyes, are notable in relation 
to a recent study on appeals by ten Brinke and Porter (2012), in which deceptive appealers were 
found to produce more expressions of upper face surprise (which the authors suggest was a 
result of failed attempts to portray sadness), and honest appealers were found to produce more 
expressions of upper face sadness. Furthermore, the vocal cues are particularly interesting, as 
for decades efforts have been made to develop voice analysis software to detect deception, 
using measures such as fundamental frequency, jitter, shimmer, and intensity. However, 
previous attempts to use measures of vocal characteristics as indicators of deception have 
generally been without success (see, for example, Giddens et al., 2013; Horvath, McCloughlan, 
Weatherman & Slowik, 2013). In contrast, the present results suggest that subjective 
impressions of vocal characteristics may capture an aspect of deceptive behaviour which it has 
not been possible to measure more objectively. 
The findings relating to personal reactions of observers to appealers are in line with 
previous research showing that liars are judged to be less pleasant than truth-tellers (DePaulo 
et al., 2003), and people feel significantly less comfortable when hearing a lie than when 
hearing a truth (Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle & Green, 1999). A possible explanation 
for this effect is that, according to the affective response factor of Zuckerman et al.’s Four 
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Factor Model (1981), liars may sound more unpleasant than truth-tellers because the former 
are more likely to experience, and manifest reactions to, unpleasant negative feelings of guilt 
and fear. The differences between deceptive and honest appealers in terms of these kinds of 
cues might also relate to norm violation; it is possible that deceptive behaviour in itself violates 
certain norms that usually go unnoticed, and, consequently, appears aberrant and unpleasant 
(hence cue descriptions such as, ‘creepy’ and ‘unnatural’). The more sympathetic personal 
reactions of the observers to the honest appealers, and their corresponding lack of sympathy 
for the deceptive appealers, are also of particular interest in relation to recent developments in 
neuroscience. Research on mirror neurons suggests that we have neural mechanisms which 
enable a form of direct experiential understanding of what we observe in others, and this 
permits us to comprehend the emotions of others (Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2006; Singer 
et al., 2004). Given the present results, therefore, it could be argued that this kind of emotional 
synchronisation is more likely to occur with genuine emotions than with faked emotions. 
The finding that deceptive appealers were rated as being less plausible than honest 
appealers is consistent with De Paulo et al’s (2003) finding that lies are less plausible than 
truths; however, in the context of an appeal, even ‘plausibility’, or lack of it, could also be 
construed as a reaction to the offender, as it could equally reflect a positive or negative trait 
attribution about the offender as a person. This brings us to a more general point about the cues 
identified in the present study; although some of the cues are accommodated by existing 
theoretical approaches, the majority of them are not. It might, therefore, be useful to entertain 
some other, newer perspectives on cues to deception. As Salfatti (2003) says, ‘Homicide grows 
out of a transaction between individuals. This transaction is a product of the individuals and 
their relationship’ (p.499). Hence, one possible alternative explanatory approach is the ‘social 
interactionist’ (SI) perspective suggested by Wright Whelan et al. (2013). According to the SI 
approach, some cues to deception may reflect not the act of deception itself, but the nature of 
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the social relationships between the offender and the victim in contexts where this is relevant. 
So, for example, one might expect honest appealers to appear more genuinely sad (as an overall 
impression, facially, and vocally), than somebody who has recently killed his or her relative, 
was presumably motivated to do so, and may need to simulate these emotions. Moreover, one 
might expect honest appealers to display more urgency in their attempt to find out what 
happened to their relative, than deceptive appealers who clearly do not have the same 
motivation regarding their relative. Importantly, this SI approach accommodates some of the 
more context-specific findings reported by ten Brinke and Porter (2012), in their analysis of 
appeals. The researchers found that deceptive appealers were more likely to produce partial 
facial expressions of disgust and happiness, and less likely to produce facial expressions of 
sadness/distress. According to the SI approach, one would expect appealers who had actually 
killed their relative to be more likely than honest appealers to leak expressions of disgust when 
talking about their relative, or to leak expressions of happiness when talking about the absence 
of their relative, and honest appealers to exhibit more expressions of sadness/distress.  
The SI approach is also useful in explaining newly identified, context specific cues in 
a different high stakes situation. As mentioned previously, several such cues were identified in 
Harpster et al.’s (2009) study of 911 homicide calls, in which, for example, honest callers were 
more likely to make a plea for help for the victim; according to the SI approach, one might 
expect somebody who has killed a victim to be less likely to plea for help for that victim. 
Deceptive callers, who had just killed the victim, were more likely to insult the victim, and to 
describe the death of the victim in terms of a problem, and to accept that the victim was dead; 
again, these behaviours could be regarded as reflecting the nature of the social interaction 
between the offender and the victim (in the case of acceptance of death, this may be a 
cognitively driven behaviour reflecting a change in the status of the victim in the relationship). 
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 A second, and related, way of interpreting some of these cues in the present cases is in 
terms of the ‘individual behavioural profile’ (IBP) account of deception (Wright Whelan et al., 
2013). In the context of appeals, and in many high stake situations, honest and deceptive 
individuals differ not only in terms of whether they are lying, but also whether they have 
committed a serious criminal act. According to the IBP approach, some of the cues identified 
in the present studies may be related to characteristics of individuals who engage in aberrant 
behaviour (kill their relative and then lie about it), rather than actual acts of deception. For 
example, as with the act of lying, less genuine emotion and empathy towards the victim are 
consistent with the stereotype of a psychopath (Davies & Feldman, 1981). Also ‘behaving 
unnaturally’, looking ‘creepy’, and not appearing likeable or worthy of sympathy, might reflect 
characteristics of people who murder relatives, rather than behaviours related to the act of 
deception. Cues relating to general characteristics of this kind will clearly not emerge as 
discriminatory in low stakes laboratory experiments, and because they may not necessarily 
relate to the act of deception per se, they may not be apparent in within subjects comparisons 
of truthful and deceptive conditions, even in high stakes situations. Consequently, while, at a 
practical level, real-life high stakes situations might potentially provide a useful source of cues 
for making probabilistic estimates about who is lying and who is not, they may pose some 
methodological problems for researchers attempting to determine cues to deception, as distinct 
from cues that identify more global characteristics of offenders.  
Clearly, as the SI and IBP approaches are newly developed, their utility in predicting 
and explaining behaviours related to deception or to honesty has not been firmly established. 
It is hoped, however, that they may be expanded to provide a theoretical rationale for cues that 
emerge only in high stakes situations, and are not readily accommodated by existing theoretical 
approaches. It is likely that the SI and IBP approaches will have relevance beyond the context 
of appeals, and may be particularly relevant to contexts which involve violent crimes in which 
SUBJECTIVE CUES TO DECEPTION IN PUBLIC APPEALS 
 
18 
 
there are offenders and victims. However, what these specific contexts may be requires further 
investigation. 
 The present studies were obviously limited in scope, both in terms of the sample size 
and the range of robust statistically significant results, and consequently can only be considered 
exploratory and tentative at this stage. Nevertheless, several previously uninvestigated cues 
were identified, and the overlap in findings between Studies 2 and 3 for cues found to be 
significant in Study 3 (all with substantial effect sizes) suggests that although the cues were not 
generated from existing theoretical approaches, they may have utility in the context of appeals. 
As the research was based on field data, clearly key experimental elements are missing. 
However, it was considered that this limitation was outweighed by the need for ecologically 
valid data; hundreds of laboratory-based experiments on deception have already been 
conducted, but replicating a high stakes environment is likely to be impossible in the 
laboratory. The identification of previously uninvestigated cues underlines the importance of 
using ecologically valid stimulus materials in deception research. Notwithstanding this, the 
western bias of the stimulus materials used in the present studies is acknowledged, and it is 
certainly possible that some behaviours may not generalise across cultures. A further limitation 
of the stimulus materials used was that the scope of the image varied in the appeals, so that in 
some cases just the head was shown, and in others more of the body was shown; it is possible 
that this may have an effect on observer responses. 
In terms of future research, initially it would be beneficial to replicate the findings of 
the present studies on a new sample of appeals, and especially to include appeals from non-
western cultures. Furthermore, the extent to which some of the newly identified cues may have 
utility in different high stakes contexts requires investigation; relatedly, the factors which may 
underlie the production of the cues (such as emotional authenticity, norm violation, and the 
personal reaction elicited in observers) may have relevance across particular high stakes 
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situations and again, this remains to be investigated in future research. It is also hoped that the 
utility of using a data-driven, context-specific, bottom-up approach has been demonstrated, and 
that this approach may be adopted in the examination of other high stakes situations.  
The basic premise of the research presented here was that the use of real life examples 
of high stakes honest and deceptive behaviour as stimulus materials, would result in findings 
different to those typically produced in low stakes deception research. This premise was 
supported, as a large number of behaviours were found to differ between honest and deceptive 
appeals, all with effect sizes much larger than is common in deception research, and it is hoped 
that this will reinforce the importance of ecological validity in deception research. In addition, 
the identification of previously uninvestigated cues suggests that it may be important to 
consider context, a factor which is often overlooked in deception research. Furthermore, it is 
hoped that the development of new theoretical approaches as suggested above may be 
beneficial when considering real world deceptive behaviour. It is unlikely that a fool proof 
system of detecting deception will be established in the foreseeable future (if ever); however, 
it is hoped that the present findings suggest fruitful avenues for future research. 
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